1942 Dieppe Raid

The August 1942 Allied raid on the French port of Dieppe (pronounced "d-yep") was the largest raid of World War II, but is generally ranked as one of the most disastrous failures of the war. Dieppe still carries a stench of incompetence and blunder even after many decades. But a careful analysis and understanding of the context of the time makes the terrible losses at least understandable, if no less horrific. There were valid reasons for undertaking the operation and the lessons learned from Dieppe were critical to success on D-Day in 1944. The courageous and brave men at Dieppe were not sacrificed in vain, for as Lord Mountbatten later said, "For every soldier who died at Dieppe, ten were saved on D-Day."

Strategic Setting for the Dieppe Raid

In June of 1940 the shattered remnants of British forces on the Continent were evacuated from Dunkirk, leaving Europe under the domination of Germany. Only Hitler's lack of preparation for a cross-channel invasion saved London from the fate of so many other European capitals. In the Battle of Britain (July-October 1940), the Luftwaffe and the RAF dueled in the skys over England and the RAF prevailed. England was safe from invasion, for the time being, as Hitler turned his ambitions eastward.

Immediately after Dunkirk, Prime Minister Churchill's government began preparations to return to the continent, a preposterous notion at the time. Military staff studied the problems of an invasion, based on the belief that it would be necessary to capture a port to support the logistics of an invading force. With this in mind, and to show the Axis that Britain could still sting them at will, several daring Commando raids struck at targets along the coasts of Europe and North Africa. At first these were merely harassment, the best the British could do in their exhausted, isolated, and unsupported position. But after Hitler attacked the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa, June 1941) and Japan attacked the United States (Pearl Harbor, December 1941) the governments of Great Britain and the United States began to seriously plan to re-invade Europe as soon as possible, to relieve pressure on the beleaguered Soviets on the Eastern Front. The Combined Operations Command was set up in London for the purpose. After several bureaucratic false starts, in October 1941 the dynamic and unorthodox Royal Navy officer Lord Louis Mountbatten was placed in charge. The well-born and well-connected Mountbatten was quite inexperienced for the job, but had a reputation for audacity, bravery, aggressive thinking, and distain for authority, just what Churchill wanted. As the infant organization of future full-scale invasions, Combined Operations conceived of large and bold endeavors.

Saint-Nazaire: Rehearsal for the Dieppe Raid (Operation Chariot)

On 28 March 1942, just after midnight, a force of 650 British Commandos and supporting naval personnel aboard eighteen small, heavily armed craft, sped up the Loire estuary on their way to attack the German naval facility at Saint-Nazaire, France. Saint-Nazaire was chosen for attack because U-boat pens were sited there along with the only dry dock on the Atlantic large enough to service Germany's dangerous battleship Tirpitz. In addition to their small craft, the attackers had an obsolete Lend-Lease destroyer (HMS Campbeltown) disguised as a German ship. The confused German defenders did not fire on the Campbeltown until it was too late. The raiders rammed the destroyer into the huge dry dock, set time-delay fuses on five tons of explosives aboard, and jumped ship. The other raider teams of demolition experts and Commandos spread havoc and destruction throughout the port, destroying the dry dock pumps and other vital equipment while setting more time delay explosives. After about two hours, with accumulating severe losses, the team withdrew. About 271 men and eight vessels returned to England.

The Germans did not understand the role of the Campbeltown. After dawn, as German personnel inspected the Campbeltown, the timed explosives blew up, killing over 200 of the enemy and further devastating the dry dock. More than two days later, other timed demolition charges planted underwater exploded destroying the harbor entrance and other facilities. Despite the large losses among the Commandos, the Saint-Nazaire raid was encouraging, the most successful raid so far. Afterward, the Germans worked for more than eighteen months to restore the dry dock, while the Tirpitz was forced to remain in northern waters where it did not threaten trans-Atlantic supply convoys.

Planning for the Dieppe Raid

In April 1942, pushed by Soviet insistence on an immediate second front in Western Europe, the joint US/UK Combined Chiefs of Staff sent Combined Operations a request to mount a significant raid on a French port. The idea was to hit the Germans hard enough to provoke a reaction that would reveal how they would respond to a real invasion. Mountbatten's second in command, Captain John Hughes-Hallett, led the planning. Dieppe was selected for its proximity to English ports and airfields, considered ideal for a rapid, stealth attack, in range for covering fighter planes. Dieppe was well defended, with difficult cliffs and headlands anchoring German guns that commanded the limited beaches. Dieppe was considered well suited as an invasion learning experience for the Allies, as well as a valuable target, with port and rail facilities, fuel dumps, a radar installation, an airfield, invasion barges, and a German headquarters to destroy, disrupt or plunder. Finally, a large raid would offer the RAF the chance to engage to Luftwaffe again with the expectation of inflicting large losses on the Germans. Such a raid would also cause a diversion of troops from the Eastern Front by forcing Hitler to increase defenses along the Atlantic and Channel coasts.

The Dieppe raid was assigned the code name Operation Rutter. Planning went on for months as Mountbatten and his staff defined an 11-mile front, centered on Dieppe. The heady optimism at Combined Operations after Saint-Nazaire made them overconfident and their complex joint command structure confused the process of determining the plan. Ultimately, Combined Operations disregarded intelligence on the strength of the German garrison and fortifications, deeming the defense too weak to worry over. They failed to provide for a single point of command, moved the main assault to the center beaches rather than a flank attack, and dropped a provision for landing paratroopers or gliders behind the Dieppe defenses. Most significantly, they ruled out heavy preparatory aerial bombing and naval shelling. Overall, Combined Operations thought that surprise was more important than any other aspect of the plan. These lapses would prove decisive in the event.

On 8 July 1942, Operation Rutter was officially cancelled. Delays due to weather, a German air raid on some of the vessels needed for the operation, and increasing German forces in the area led to doubts about Rutter's viability. If Rutter had remained cancelled, all the losses would have been avoided. But Mountbatten was eager to get a big operation going, to fulfill the mandate of Combined Operations. Within a few days, Rutter was reborn as Operation Jubilee, with verbal approval from the Chiefs of Staff and the Prime Minister.

Preparations for the Dieppe Raid

The Dieppe raid utilized an assault force of six infantry battalions, one tank regiment, two Commando teams, and support units, landed in six separate operations. The bulk of the manpower was provided by 2nd Canadian Division, commanded by Major General John Hamilton Roberts, an experienced and respected officer. Other Allied units, including fifty U.S. Rangers, were included.

Concerns about operational security motivated decisions that weakened the prospects of the Dieppe raid. Training of the Canadian assault troops was curtailed and transport was arranged directly from English bases, to avoid troop movements that would signal the raid to German operatives or aircraft. The final plan was too complex and rigid, highly dependent on the precise timing of multiple assault phases to destroy the guns overlooking the beaches, establish beachheads, and to cross the secured beach to objectives inland. After carrying out demolitions, disruptions, and destruction of German facilities and personnel, the raiders would withdraw across the Dieppe beaches protected by a covering force. It looked good on paper.

As the August date of the Dieppe raid approached, the war situation looked worse than ever for the Allies. German armies were victorious everywhere from the English Channel to the Black Sea as well as in North Africa while U-Boats were cutting the lifeline to England. The similarly successful and expanding Japanese were threatening India, with the unthinkable potential to link with the Wehrmacht in the Middle East. An Allied victory was badly needed, but Dieppe would not be it.

The Dieppe Raid

The Dieppe raid, 19 August 1942. Source, P16. Corrected.

The Royal Navy flotilla of 237 ships and 15 minesweepers left Newhaven and other ports to cross the Channel for arrival off Dieppe at 0300 on 19 August 1942. The ships were delivering 5,000 Canadian infantry and tank crews, 1,100 British Commandos, a few Free French soldiers and fifty U.S. Rangers. They arrived in radio silence and blacked out, surprise was nearly achieved. For the raiders, the left flank of the battle zone was to the east and the right was west.

The first phase was to land four assault teams at dawn, to take the east and west outlying coastal gun batteries and the two headlands flanking the port. Through bad luck and poor communications, the 460-man No. 3 Commando landing at Berneval on the eastern flank ran into an armed convoy of German supply ships. The engagement scattered the landing force, confused the other landings, and raised the alarm on the coast. No. 3 Commando did eventually reach their objective, but the German defenders were fully alerted as the attack staggered ashore. The Commandos put up a fierce fight but had no chance against superior numbers and entrenched positions. By the end of the morning, 38 No. 3 Commandos were dead and 82 were prisoners. Also killed at Berneval was Ranger Lt. Edwin Loustalot, the first American killed in Europe during WW II.

At the far western flank of the Dieppe raid, No. 4 Commando fell upon the gun battery at Varengeville. Here the fierce assault succeeded. With bayonets and knives, 252 Commandos killed all but four of the German defenders and put the guns out of action. At 0730, as planned, they withdrew with no losses, mission accomplished.

The two Commando raids on the outlying guns did prevent the Germans from firing on the landing fleet. The next phase was a twin attack on the headlands commanding the port. At Puys, to the east of Dieppe, the 650-man Royal Regiment of Canada made a delayed landing which eliminated any surprise. The Germans in pillboxes and fortified buildings above the beach cut the Royals to pieces with rifles, machine guns, mortars and light artillery. It was butchery. In a few minutes, the Royal Regiment ceased to exist. The one-sided fight went on as more landing craft came in, delivering the Canadians to almost certain death. At 0800 the surviving Canadians surrendered. Only 67 of the 650 who landed returned to England that day. The rest were dead or captured, many of those injured.

At the west headland, at Pourville, the South Saskatchewan regiment landed on time and achieved surprise. They initially did well, taking Pourville and advancing inland. They were reinforced by the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada who advanced to the airfield at St. Aubin. The two regiments established positions to wait for tanks from the main Dieppe landing. When no tanks came, they were forced to fall back, pressed by increasing German forces. Key objectives were not taken and both regiments had to fall back to the beach, waiting for evacuation. There they fought and died under horrific conditions until a partial rescue mid-day. Eventually 601 men were taken off the beach at Pourville while 690 were killed or wounded.

In the area of the main assault on Dieppe, the bodies of Canadian soldiers lie among damaged landing craft and Churchill tanks of the Calgary Regiment, 19 August 1942. Courtesy Canadian War Museum.

At 0520 the main assault on Dieppe commenced. 1,552 infantry and tank crews moved toward the central beach under the umbrella of a naval bombardment and low level attack by fifty RAF Hawker Hurricane fighter planes. The raid commanders, on a headquarters ship, did not know that the flanking attacks were in trouble and got no feedback on the inadequacy of the softening up. Radio operators ashore were selectively killed by the Germans and protective smoke screens obscured the beach from offshore observation. The attack by the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry Regiment on the western side of the beach and the Essex Scottish Regiment to the east was immediately blunted by intense German fire. Although small units made heroic efforts and local breakthroughs, overall the attack stalled. Tanks of the Calgary Regiment, landing behind the infantry, could not get off the beach into the town, finding the antitank obstacles impenetrable. General Roberts, believing that forces ashore were succeeding, ordered in the reserves to exploit the success. At 0700 the French-Canadian Fusilliers Mont-Royal landed, partly in the wrong place, and were ground up like the others. The last reserves, the Royal Marine Commandos, plunged into the beach, found chaos and carnage, and tried to withdraw. Their leader, Col. J.P. Phillips, exposed himself to withering fire in order to signal retreat to many of the landing boats, saving their lives at the cost of his own.

By 0900 it was clear to Gen. Roberts that the attack was failing and that an evacuation was the only way to save as many of the assault troops as possible. It took until 1100 to actually start the evacuation, leaving the beaches as a killing ground until then, an agony for those waiting ashore. As the RAF and Luftwaffe fought an epic battle overhead, dazed survivors tried to get off the beach into boats as the Germans poured unanswered fire on them. The few remaining tank crews sacrificed any hope of their own survival to try keep the Germans off the beach. Massive German artillery bombardment of the beach slaughtered survivors as they tried to get away. Rescue craft, overloaded, capsized or were blown apart by shell fire. Desperate survivors and the crews of the rescue boats struggled beyond endurance to save as many as possible.

At 1220 the rescue was abandoned. At 1308 a signal came from an officer on the beach: "Our people have surrendered." As the Germans closed in to take them prisoner, Allied soldiers dragged their comrades out of the surf to prevent them from drowning. Some just sat and wept.

Of the 5,100 troops landed at Dieppe on 19 August 1942, 3,648 did not return. The Commandos, better trained and with a less rigid plan, did the best percentage-wise while the Canadians suffered most with 907 killed and 1,946 taken prisoner. The 2nd Canadian Division was nearly wiped out. The Royal Navy lost a destroyer, 33 landing craft, and 550 men while the RAF lost another 153 men as well as lopsided losses of more than 100 aircraft. German losses were light.

All but one of the key Allied leaders involved in the Dieppe operation went on without being held accountable for the disaster. The exception was General Roberts who lost his division, perhaps for unrelated reasons, and never got another combat command. He never publicly attempted to defend his record.

Strategic Impact of Dieppe

Exhausted and disheveled Canadian survivors of Operation Jubilee arrive back in Newhaven after the raid on Dieppe, 20 August 1942. Courtesy National Archives of Canada.

Both the Germans and the Allies learned from the Dieppe disaster. The Germans were convinced by Dieppe that any attempted invasion could be stopped on the beach and destroyed there. All the ports in northern France were developed into highly fortified positions with heavy commitments of coastal guns of all sizes, anti-aircraft artillery, and concrete emplacements of arms to repel landings. Even though the Germans expected a port to be the main Allied focus, they did not neglect the beaches. When the Allies came ashore in Normandy on D-day (June 1944), they met obstacles to landing craft and tanks that were designed based on the Dieppe experience. But the Allies learned too; they used demolition teams to clear the obstacles, had specialized tanks and other vehicles to solve problems identified at Dieppe and afterward, developed artificial harbors to provide for port facilities, improved ship to shore communications, and many other innovations that contributed to victory.

While the Atlantic Wall at the beach was indeed formidable, there was little depth to the German defense since their doctrine insisted the attack would be destroyed at the water line. Once the attacking force got off the beach, the Germans could only mount a weak defense until reinforcements arrived. Drawing on the lesson of Dieppe, the Allies exploited the German approach, first by a main attack that avoided a frontal assault on a port, and second by a rapid build up of forces that kept ahead of the German ability to reinforce and counterattack. However, to achieve the necessary mass of forces, landing craft, and logistical support deemed necessary in the aftermath of Dieppe, the Allied re-invasion of Europe was delayed from 1943 to mid-1944.

Recommended Books about the Dieppe Raid

• The Dieppe Raid: The Story of the Disastrous 1942 Mission
• Dieppe 1942: Prelude to D-Day
• Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid
• Dress Rehearsal - The Story of Dieppe
• Rangers at Dieppe: The First Combat Action of U.S. Army Rangers in World War II

Find More Information on the Internet

There are many fine websites that have additional information on this topic, too many to list here and too many to keep up with as they come and go. Use this Google web search form to get an up to date report of what's out there.

For good results, try entering this: dieppe raid. Then click the Search button.

Especially recommended:

• Dieppe 1942: Reconnaissance In Force with Strategic Overtones

Find at Amazon:  Military Issue equipment, clothing, boots, MREs, MOLLE gear and much more.